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Wrong from the Start? North Carolinaís
ìPredatory Lendingî Law and the Practice
vs. Product Debate
Donald C. Lampe*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawmakers seeking to protect consumers from ìpredatoryî
lenders face an initial, critical decision: should the state regulate
specific loan products or specific loan practices? North Carolina
lawmakers have tried both.
The North Carolina high-cost home loan (ìpredatory
lendingî) statute, enacted in 1999, was the first state statute of
its kind.1 The basic design of the law has been emulated and
followed in nearly forty states, municipalities, and counties.2 As
such, the law has become the de facto model for state and
municipal ìpredatory lendingî legislation, regulation, and
ordinances throughout the country.3 This initial law emerged
from a nearly unregulated setting for mortgage loan originations
It was ìthreshold-based,î meaning it
in North Carolina.4
imposed severe restrictions and regulations on loans carrying
interest rates and terms above a certain numerical threshold. As
observers have noted and experience has shown, threshold-based
loan regulation ultimately impacts the basic availability of
certain loan products.
Laws directed toward mortgage originators and their sales
practices regulate the process by which consumers obtain those
* Member, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina.
The
analysis and conclusions herein solely are the authorís views and do not represent the
views or opinions of any person, firm, entity or organization other than the author.
Portions of this article first appeared in the authorís white paper, ìTrigger Happy:
Enactment and Aftereffects of North Carolinaís ëPredatory Lendingí Law,î presented at
The Federalist Societyís Predatory Lending Conference, July 24, 2003, in Washington,
D.C.
1 Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of
Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 711
(2003).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 68-83.
3 See infra text accompanying note 60.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 14-15.
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productsówithout necessarily impairing availability of credit.5
Despite the attention given the original 1999 statute, the
evidence shows that the stateís consumer protection objectives
were better realized by the enactment of a second law, known as
the Mortgage Lending Act.6 It provided for comprehensive
mortgage broker licensure and oversight. The recent upsurge in
enactment of residential mortgage lending laws has given rise to
a lively debate on whether threshold-based (ìproductî)
regulations are appropriate in light of more market-friendly
options that reach the sales process and practice.
North Carolinaís experience with comprehensive laws of both
types is instructive. It suggests that any state that elects to
regulate high-cost home mortgage lending by means of a
threshold-based law should first examine whether its existing
ìpracticeî regulation is adequate. That is, are mortgage loan
originators regulated at the state level in a fashion that assures
fairness, disclosure, and accountability to the consumer? Is the
process by which consumers, particularly vulnerable populations,
obtain mortgage credit appropriately regulated? The practices
and procedures approach is inherently less intrusive to the
marketplace than regulations that effectively prohibit certain
types of loans and may even provide a greater level of consumer
protection. Moreover, the availability of credit to deserving
borrowers will be less seriously impaired by appropriate
regulation of sales practices in residential mortgage lending than
by effective prohibition of higher-cost mortgage loan products.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the late 1990ís, the North Carolina Attorney Generalís
office fielded numerous complaints and assembled substantial
data regarding perceived abuses in the residential mortgage loan
business.7 This data led the Attorney Generalís office and the
North Carolina Banking Commissioner to conclude that existing
federal law and North Carolinaís usury, mortgage banking, and
mortgage brokering statutes were not strong enough to protect
consumers from overcharging by mortgage lenders.8 Very often,
See infra text accompanying notes 85-93.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ßß 53-243.01 to 53-244 (2003).
Rah Bickley, Lending Practices Face Checks, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Apr. 6,
1999, at B4. North Carolina Attorney General Mike Easley noted at a public forum that
North Carolina was increasingly beset with mortgage brokers and lenders who made
costly loans. Alan Hirsch, the head of the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney
Generalís office, said the issue had exploded over the prior eighteen months and mortgage
lending abuse was under investigation. Id.
8 See Carol Frey, Lending Law Showing Its Teeth, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh),
Sept. 10, 1999, at D1. The state Banking Commission received well over 1,000 complaints
(in 1999) and three-quarters of them were attributable to mortgage brokers and lenders.
5
6
7
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the perceived overcharges were manifested in ìjunk feesîó
numerous separately-named and itemized charges imposed by
mortgage brokers and lenders.9 As the debate over residential
mortgage regulation took shape, it became apparent that, due to
federal preemption, many mortgage lenders doing business in
North Carolina were free to impose and collect these charges
without state law limitation.10
The Attorney General established a ìworking groupî of
interested parties to evaluate the need for reform of North
Carolinaís residential mortgage lending laws. In addition to
industry representatives the group included consumer advocacy
organizations, such as the Self-Help Credit Union and the
Coalition for Responsible Lending.11 Quickly focusing on the
possibility of substantive change, the group discerned that the
General Assembly was amenable to a broad overhaul of mortgage
lending law.12 As the discussions continued, consumer advocates
(and the Attorney Generalís staff) brought forth compelling
evidence of allegedly abusive mortgage lending practices,
including videotapes of national newsmagazine broadcasts
dealing with the worst cases of mortgage lending abuse.13 It was
difficult, to say the least, for industry representatives to speak in
ìsupportî of such practices.
In North Carolina, the alleged abuses had occurred in a
lawless environment. The original North Carolina mortgage
banking law, first enacted in 1988, was merely a registration
statute.14 Mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers were not
Id.
B5.

9

Customers Angry About Loan Fees, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro), May 10, 1999, at

See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
See Credit Unions Target Unfair Mortgages, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro), May 7,
1999, at B8. The Coalition for Responsible Lending is ìan alliance of financial
institutions, religious organizations, community groups and othersî that is pushing
legislation to end predatory lending practices by mortgage companies. N.C. Predatory
Mortgage Lending Law, at http://www.responsiblelending.org/predlend_nc/faqs.cfm (last
visited March 9, 2004). According to the groupís website, the law ìwas developed over five
months of intense discussion by the NC Bankers Association, the NC Mortgage Bankers
Association, the NC Credit Union Network, the NC Association of Financial Institutions,
the NC Association of Mortgage Professionals, the NC Attorney Generalís Office, and the
Coalition for Responsible Lending.î Id.
12 See Glenn J. Kalinoski, NHEMA Fears Bills Could End Home Equity Lending in
State, NATíL MORTGAGE NEWS, May 17, 1999, at 16. Senator Roy Cooper said the bill is
the result of months of negotiations involving the Attorney Generalís office,
representatives from major banks, representatives from mortgage bankers and brokers
groups, and representatives from credit unions. Id.
13 Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Along With a Lender, Is Citigroup
Buying Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, ß 3, at 1. Martin Eakes, the founder of SelfHelp Credit Union, piloted carts carrying VCRís into the North Carolina capitol building
so that legislators could watch tapes about abusive lending practices. Id.
14 N.C. GEN. STAT. ßß 53-233 to 53-243 (1988) (repealed 2002).
10
11
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subject to examination by the North Carolina Banking
Commissioner.15
In addition, the law exempted all HUDapproved mortgagees (in addition to customary exemptions for
banks, credit unions, and savings institutions).16 Employees and
officers were also exempt from registration, meaning that anyone
who could find employment with a registered or exempt
mortgage firm could make or broker mortgage loans to
consumers without registering.17 Under the original North
Carolina law, many, if not most, non-chartered mortgage
companies transacted business with little or no state law
regulatory oversight.
As first proposed, the North Carolina predatory lending bill,
S. 1149, did contain limitations and prohibitions on the practices
of mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers in addition to its
threshold-based provisions.18 Almost simultaneously, a second
bill focusing more comprehensively on regulation and licensing of
mortgage bankers and brokers, S. 866, also reached the
Assembly.19 But S. 866 did not pass, and S. 1149 was finally
approved without its provisions for mortgage-banking
regulation.20 In effect, the General Assembly had decided,
despite significant issues surrounding compliance, to focus its
legislative efforts on thresholds, choosing to regulate loan terms
and products rather than brokers, bankers, and originators. In
retrospect there is something fateful about this outcome: had the
General Assembly instead chosen to emphasize licensing and
regulation, the nationwide trend of sweeping ìpredatory lendingî
legislation might never have begun at all.
Contrary to some portrayals, the ìpredatory lendingî law did
not receive unanimous support from the lending industry in
North Carolina.
Representatives of the consumer finance
industry never formally endorsed it, and community banks and
15 Id. ß 53-234(6)(a) (repealed 2002). See also Joseph A. Smith, Jr., North Carolinaís
Predatory Lending Law: Its Adoption and Implementation (July 26, 2002), available at
http://www.banking.state.nc.us/commissionerpage.htm. Commissioner Smith observed
that:
Prior to the adoption of the Mortgage Lending Act, some mortgage bankers and
all mortgage brokers in North Carolina were required to be registered with
OCOB. The registration was required only of the firms engaged in these
activities, not of individual loan originators. There were several general
normative prohibitions in the predecessor law but limited bases for
enforcement and little in the way of enforcement measures and resources.
Id. at 5.
16 N.C. GEN. STAT. ß 53-234(6) (repealed 2002).
17 Id.
18 S. 1149, 1999 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999).
19 See S. 866, 1999 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999).
20 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1999-332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ßß 24-1.1A to 24-10.2
(2003)).
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credit unions could not comprehend at the time how the complex
law would affect them.21 Many mortgage brokers, however, were
pleased by a statute that purported ìreformî but failed to directly
regulate them.
As noted, the regulatory provisions rejected in 1999 did
follow S. 1149 into law as the Mortgage Lending Act22 after
further negotiations with consumer advocacy groups, the
Attorney Generalís office, and industry representatives.23 The
new law, discussed infra at Section VI, came about with the
support of the same parties who had pressed for S. 1149 in
1999,24 and was, in effect, a continuation of the original effort to
reform predatory lending.25 As such, it created a strong practiceoriented framework for the regulation of residential mortgage
lending in North Carolina. In contrast to S. 1149, the Mortgage
Lending Act has proven itself a law that works to prevent
lending abuse while sustaining marketplace freedom. But the
broad effects of S. 1149 had already been felt, both in North
Carolina and nationwide.
III. THE SCOPE OF S. 1149
S. 1149 was based on the federal Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act (ìHOEPAî).26 Passed in 1994 as part of the
federal Truth in Lending Act, HOEPA, in tandem with Section 32
of Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z,27 established certain feeand interest rate-based ìtriggers.î When the terms of a loan
exceed these thresholds, the loan is deemed to be covered by the
law, and a host of disclosure requirements and prohibitions on
loan terms are imposed.28 Under the federal law, states are left
free to impose broader restrictions or more restrictive triggers if
they so choose.
21 Kalinoski, supra note 12, at 16. NHEMA opposed the two predatory lending bills
in North Carolina out of fear that they would wipe out home equity lending. Id. Some
lenders were angered by the unnecessary government intrusion into the free market.
Paul Donohue of MoneyNet Mortgage Planning Services stated the law was dangerous
precedent. Meredith Barkley, ìPredatory Lendingî Law Aids Buyers But Lenders Say it
May Keep Some Buyers Out of the Market, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro), Nov. 14, 1999, at
G1.
22 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ßß 53-243.01 to 53-243.16 (2003).
23 Press Release, North Carolina Attorney General, Cooper Applauds House Passage
of Bill Toughening Predatory Lending Laws (Aug. 16, 2001), http://www.jus.state.nc.us/in/
press/081601.htm.
24 Compare N.C. Predatory Mortgage Lending Law, supra note 11, with Press
Release, North Carolina Attorney General, supra note 23.
25 See 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2001-393.
26 Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
103-325, ßß 151-58, 108 Stat. 2190-2198 (1994) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. ßß 16011604 and scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
27 12 C.F.R. ß 226.32 (2003).
28 15 U.S.C. ßß 1602(aa)(1), 1639 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
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S. 1149 formed part of the stateís general usury (interest
rate regulation) statute,29 and its substance was twofold:
threshold-based restrictions and limitations on certain types of
home loans, as well as certain restrictions or prohibitions
applicable to all home loans. The threshold-based portion of the
law, following HOEPA, established that if a residential mortgage
loan carried an interest rate above a certain annual percentage
rate or ìpoints and feesî exceeding a set percentage of the total
loan amount, it became a ìhigh-cost loan,î30 and a wide range of
restrictions, limitations, and prohibitions were triggered.31
N.C. GEN. STAT. ßß 24-1 to 24-17 (2003).
Id. ß 24-1.1E(a)(4) (2003). The statute defined high-cost loan:
A ìhigh-cost home loanî means a loan other than a reverse mortgage
transaction in which:

29
30

a. The principal amount of the loan (or, in the case of an open-end credit
plan, the borrowerís initial maximum credit limit) does not exceed the lesser of
(i) the conforming loan size limit for a single-family dwelling as established
from time to time by Fannie Mae, or (ii) three hundred thousand dollars
($300,000);
b.

The borrower is a natural person;

c. The debt is incurred by the borrower primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes;
d. The loan is secured by either (i) a security interest in a manufactured
home . . . which is or will be occupied by the borrower as the borrowerís
principal dwelling, or (ii) a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate upon which
there is located or there is to be located a structure or structures designed
principally for occupancy of from one to four families which is or will be
occupied by the borrower as the borrowerís principal dwelling; and
e. The terms of the loan exceed one or more of the thresholds as defined in
subdivision (6) of this section.
Id.

N.C. GEN. STAT. ß 24-1.1E(b) (2003). The prohibitions included:
(1) No call provision. óNo high-cost home loan may contain a provision which
permits the lender, in its sole discretion, to accelerate the indebtedness. This
provision does not apply when repayment of the loan has been accelerated by
default, pursuant to a due-on-sale provision, or pursuant to some other
provision of the loan documents unrelated to the payment schedule.

31

(2) No balloon payment. óNo high-cost home loan may contain a scheduled
payment that is more than twice as large as the average of earlier scheduled
payments. This provision does not apply when the payment schedule is
adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income of the borrower.
(3) No negative amortization. óNo high-cost home loan may contain a
payment schedule with regular periodic payments that cause the principal
balance to increase.
(4) No increased interest rate. óNo high-cost home loan may contain a
provision which increases the interest rate after default. This provision does
not apply to interest rate changes in a variable rate loan otherwise consistent
with the provisions of the loan documents, provided the change in the interest
rate is not triggered by the event of default or the acceleration of the
indebtedness.
(5) No advance payments. óNo high-cost home loan may include terms under
which more than two periodic payments required under the loan are
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Notably, only the interest rate threshold was left identical to
HOEPA; the other definitions and threshold amounts contained
in S. 1149 were modified.32 In fact, the definition of ìpoints and
feesî and the mathematical means to calculate the ìceilingî were
drafted from whole cloth and had no exact precedent in federal or
state law.
The general restrictions and prohibitions of S. 1149 included
a ban on prepayment fees for consumer-purpose, owner-occupied,
first-mortgage loans.33 The bill also included a number of new
restrictions applicable to all home loans, including prohibitions
on encouraging default and on the financing of credit insurance
premiums, as well as a requirement that the borrower receive a
real benefit from any refinancing transaction.34 This latter
standard, aimed at the predatory practice of ìflipping,î required
the lender to determine that in any refinance of less than
$300,000, the buyer was provided with ìreasonable, tangible net
benefit . . . considering all of the circumstances.î35
As a general regulation of loan terms, S. 1149 applied to all
lenders making residential mortgage loans in North Carolina,
not merely those licensed or chartered by the state. That is, the
General Assembly assumed that all residential mortgage lenders
were in need of strict and punitive regulation, based not on a
lenderís legal or regulatory status or track record but solely on
loan terms.36 As a result, even such community and faith-based
lenders as Habitat for Humanity were covered by the sweep of S.
1149, and new remedial provisions in the North Carolina statute
compounded compliance risk for conforming, law-abiding lenders.
Statutory unfair and deceptive trade practice remedies appeared
in North Carolinaís usury law for the first time, including
consolidated and paid in advance from the loan proceeds provided to the
borrower.
(6) No modification or deferral fees. óA lender may not charge a borrower any
fees to modify, renew, extend, or amend a high-cost home loan or to defer any
payment due under the terms of a high-cost home loan.
Id.

32 Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending Initiatives, Legislation and Litigation:
Federal Regulation, State Law and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 78, 81
(2002).
33 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1999-332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ß 24-1.1A(b)(1)
(2003)).
34 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1999-332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ß 24-10.2 (2003)).
35 Id. ìFlippingî is the practice of refinancing a home loan from one consumer home
mortgage to another with no discernible benefit to the consumer. Id.
36 A participant in the working group later referred to this as a ìshotgunî approach
to the problem of abusive lending. James Creekman, Group Life President, First Citizens
Bank, Remarks at Federal Reserve Public Hearing on Home Equity Lending 30 (July 27,
2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/20000727/200007
27.htm.
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provisions for attorney fees.37
S. 1149 succeeded and was enacted in part because of
consumer advocatesí distaste for the effects of federal preemption
in the residential mortgage-lending arena. In the course of
drafting the legislation, federal preemption, particularly by the
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (ìAMTPAî),38
became a sort of demon for state regulators and consumer
advocates.39 The working group came to realize that capping fees
and charges under the usury statute would have limited effect
against the many lenders in North Carolina claiming some sort
of federal preemption, including AMTPA preemption.40 S. 1149
was therefore written with full recognition of, if not explicit
intent to avoid, federal preemption in residential mortgage
lending in North Carolina.41
State regulators and consumer advocates in North Carolina
also were not pleased with the ability of out-of-state financial
institutions to ìimportî interest rates and fees to North Carolina
under preemption theories affirmed by the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.42 At the North Carolina Bar Associationís
Real Property Section Annual Meeting in May 1999, while the
predatory lending bill was still under consideration by the
General Assembly, the stateís Assistant Attorney General,
McNeil Chestnut, detailed his reservations about federal
preemption and interpretations thereof by the Comptroller of the
Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).43 Chestnut, a member of the working group that advised
in the drafting of S. 1149, suggested that the federal banking
agencies had, among other things, been misinterpreting the
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ßß 24-10.2(f) (2003).
12 U.S.C. ßß 3801-3805 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
See Chris Serres, Court Battle Brewing for N.C. Law, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), Oct. 6, 2000, at A1. Alan Hirsch of the Attorney Generalís office stated ì[t]he
State Attorney Generalís Office was aware of the discrepancy between state and federal
law when the bill was being written last year.î Id.
40 Brian Collins, States Promote Own Lending Laws, NATíL MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept.
6, 1999, at 7. Philip Lehman, Assistant Attorney General for North Carolina, stated that
the state was very aware of preemption at the state level and did everything possible to
make the predatory lending law ìpreemption-proof.î Id.
41 Letter from L. McNeil Chestnut, Assistant Attorney General, North Carolina, to
Elizabeth H. Eason, Attorney, Law Offices of Patrick W. McKee (July 30, 2001) (on file
with the author). The letter states, ìMore importantly, we believe that the North
Carolina Act has been structured in such a manner as to avoid claims of federal
preemption.î Id. at 2.
42 See, e.g., Marquette Natíl Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439
U.S. 299, 313-14 (1978); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 831 (1st
Cir. 1992).
43 L. McNeil Chestnut, A Summary Review of Usury Issues, Paper Presented to 1999
North Carolina Bar Association Real Property Section Annual Meeting (1999) (on file
with the author).
37
38
39
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federal regulations regarding banksí ability to export interest
rates.44 It follows that the proponents of North Carolinaís
predatory lending act desired the law to appear in the guise of
ìconsumer protectionî rather than in the form of direct
limitations on rates and fees.
Since it did not explicitly limit rates, fees, prepayment
charges or other purely economic loan terms, S. 1149 arguably
had no relationship to federal preemption. Rather, the statute
imposed a host of consumer protection and compliance
requirements on mortgage lenders, enforced by severe remedial
provisions, when they made loans carrying a higher interest rate
or fees. To the extent that this part of the statute discouraged
federally-preempted lenders from making ìhigh-costî loans in
North Carolina, the statute may be viewed as a ìstealth overrideî
of federal preemption.
IV. THE IMPACT OF S. 1149
The impact of the North Carolina ìpredatory lendingî law
must be viewed in terms of increased risk to compliance-oriented
mortgage lenders and increased compliance costs. Under its
strict liability provisions, even the most diligent and risk-averse
lenders could be penalized. That is, it included no element of
intent; if the triggers are ìtripped,î the lender becomes liable for
not complying with the many resulting additional requirements.
The law also troubled lenders with its ambiguous, non-standard
definitions and limited opportunity for cure.
As soon as it appeared that the working group was in the
process of creating a broad predatory lending bill, lending
industry representatives in North Carolina began to express
concerns about the potential impact on credit availability.45
These arguments clearly did not win the day. In an attempt at
compromise, the General Assembly did agree to add a rider to S.
1149, providing for the appointment of a legislative study
committee to analyze the effect of the law on the availability of
credit.46 But the appointment of this study committee was not
mandatory, and the leadership of the General Assembly
ultimately chose not to do so.
Generally speaking, consumer advocates in the predatory
lending arena believe that high-cost home loans should not be
Id. at III-6.
Kalinoski, supra note 12, at 16. Wright Andrews, a partner at Butera & Andrews,
commented that the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law would dramatically curtail
credit availability for many North Carolina citizens. Id.
46 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1999-332 ß 7.
44
45
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made available to consumers in the first instance.47 This was
borne out at hearings on HOEPA in North Carolina before the
Federal Reserve Board in 2000, where working group
participants testified that it was the intent of the legislation to
effectively end the making of high-cost home loans to North
Carolina consumers.48
To a large degree, S. 1149 fulfilled this goal. As detailed
infra, experience quickly showed that many legitimate lenders
would not tolerate the compliance burdens, coupled with the
substantial legal risks of non-compliance, not to mention the
significant reputation risk. Another measure of the impact can
be seen in the incidence of counseling required for high-cost home
loans. According to informal statements by the staff members
from the Attorney Generalís office and the North Carolina
Housing Finance Authority, very few such counseling sessions
have occurred since S. 1149ís passage.49 This is a strong
indication that very few such loans have been made, particularly
since some loans do not close even after a counseling session has
been undertaken. Banks have adopted a novel compliance
strategy for the high-cost home loan law: avoidance.50 Today, no
compliance-oriented lender doing business in North Carolina is
(knowingly) making loans with costs high enough to trigger the
additional restrictions imposed by S. 1149.
Overall, a number of studies show that the North Carolina
ìpredatory lendingî law has led to a reduction in the availability
of higher cost or ìsubprimeî mortgage loan credit in the state.51
By contrast, other studies conducted by consumer advocates have
attempted to prove that either this is not the case or that,
regardless of any reduction, subprime lending continued to have
a negative effect on consumers.52 Taken together, however, the
47 See Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate
Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 141 (2002).
48 See Martin Eakes, President and CEO, Self-Help, Remarks at Federal Reserve
Public Hearing on Home Equity Lending 85 (July 27, 2000), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/20000727/20000727.htm.
49 See William Bost, Gen. Counsel, N.C. Assín of Mortgage Profs., Remarks at
Federal Reserve Public Hearing on Home Equity Lending 52 (July 27, 2000), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/20000727/20000727.htm.
50 Comptroller of the Currency, Admír of Natíl Banks, Economic Issues in Predatory
Lending 20-21 (July 30, 2003), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resources/predlend/main.
html.
51 See Gregory Elliehausen & Michael E. Staten, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage
Products: An Analysis of North Carolinaís Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
ECON. (forthcoming 2004), McDonough School of Business Credit Research Center,
Working Paper No. 66, 2002, available at http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/publications.html;
Keith D. Harvey & Peter J. Nigro, Do Predatory Lending Laws Influence Mortgage
Lending? An Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN.
& ECON. (forthcoming 2004).
52 See Keith Ernst et al., North Carolinaís Subprime Home Loan Market After
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studies to date on the impact of North Carolinaís statute either
support or do not refute the fact that the North Carolina lawís
ìtriggersî form usury ceilings on residential mortgage loans
made after the effective date of the law.
Whether state law usury ceilings themselves are valid public
policy objectives is debatable. Many economists believe that such
legislation is undesirable.53 From the experience in North
Carolina, it can be assumed that complex, non-standard,
threshold-based, punitive predatory lending statutes establish
usury ceilings at the interest rate/APR and ìpoints and feesî
thresholds. That is, reputable lenders will simply not assume the
costs and risks of making loans that exceed these thresholds.
Accordingly, this makes the state-by-state legislative task of
deciding ìhow low to goî for thresholds highly significant and the
question of credit availability very important.54 The recognition
of the usury-ceiling effect of these state and local laws by federal
banking regulators (and perhaps the United States Congress)
should further inform the preemption debate.
The practical impact of S. 1149 on lending in North Carolina
has been strong. Few lenders announced publicly that they
would leave the mortgage market in North Carolina following the
enactment of S. 1149, but such departures occurred
nonetheless.55 Published reports and anecdotal evidence indicate
that a number of prime mortgage lenders withdrew from North

Predatory Lending Reform (Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.responsiblelending.org; Roberto G.
Quercia et al., The Impact of North Carolinaís Anti-Predatory Lending Law: A Descriptive
Assessment (June 25, 2003),
http://www.kenanflagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/CC_NC_Anti_Predatory_Law_Impact.pdf.
53 E.g., Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences: The Risks of Premature State
Regulation of Predatory Lending 18, http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/D881716A-1C7511D5-AB7B-00508B95258D/28871/PredReport200991.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). See
also Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Federal Banking Agenciesí Guidance on Subprime Lending:
Regulation with a Divided Mind, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 73, 75 (2002) [hereinafter Smith,
Federal Banking]. The author, now Banking Commissioner of North Carolina, concludes,
ìSubprime lending can accomplish a social good by providing credit to borrowers in need
of a second chance because of damaged credit and to borrowers, primarily low income low
wealth borrowers, whose financial status would not otherwise allow them to obtain credit
through traditional channels. . . . Public policy has stepped into the subprime market to
protect the deposit insurance fund from moral hazard and borrowers from predatory
conduct. The result has been an increase in the cost of subprime lending and a reduction
in revenue potential. Regulation with a divided mind has, in all probability, resulted in
less subprime lending at the margin, desirable and undesirable.î Id. at 107.
54 See Adam Wasch, Anticipating Revised Fed Rule, Sarbanes Ponders New
Legislation, 77 BANKING REP. 173, 175 (July 2001).
55 Erick Bergquist, Industry Hits Back On Lending Abuse Laws, AM. BANKER, Jan
26, 2001, at 1. A well-known national lender ìquietly pulled its subprime operations out
of North Carolina, citing draconian restrictions in the stateís law against predatory
lendingî as the reason. Id.
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Carolina completely.56 Many lower-volume lenders, weighing
marginal economic return against significant new compliance
costs, may have followed suit.57
At a minimum, it is apparent that residential mortgage
lenders gave increased scrutiny to product offerings and loan
terms. In particular, the ìanti-flippingî section of S. 1149, with
its ìreasonable tangible net benefitî provision, probably caused a
greater impact on credit availability than the rest of the statuteís
provisions combined. It is credited with causing a number of
large, otherwise-responsible mortgage lenders doing business in
North Carolina to simply stop making subprime loans in the
state.58 Thus, the statute has had an adverse impact on the
availability of conforming, lower cost credit as well as targeted
ìpredatoryî activities.59
V.

ENACTMENTS IN OTHER STATES

The debate over the impact of the North Carolina law
remains lively, and has assumed additional importance as S.
1149 continues to be used as a model for other states. In fact,
many states and municipalities followed North Carolinaís
threshold-based, HOEPA-like approach. By the beginning of
2004, nearly 40 state and local high-cost home loan laws had
been enacted since the passage of S. 1149 in North Carolina.60
Id.; Smith, Federal Banking, supra note 53, at 74 n.4.
See Smith, Federal Banking, supra note 53, at 107.
See David Boraks, B of A: Subprime Is Not Worth The Trouble, AM. BANKER, Aug.
16, 2001, at 1.
59 Id.
B of Aís decision to leave the business has also raised eyebrows among
consumer advocates, who typically battle banks over their lending practices to
poor and minority customers. Robert Gnaizda, general counsel at the
Greenlining Institute in San Francisco, said he was saddened to see B of A
pulling out of subprime lending.
56
57
58

ìItís not a loss; itís a disaster. B of A has the potential to be the most
responsible and the largest subprime lender,î Mr. Gnaizda said. The company
is currently No. 4 [nationwide], writing $7.8 billion of loans in 2000. But Mr.
Gnaizda said he thinks the strict North Carolina law, and legislative
rumblings in other states, helped steer the company away from the business.
And he blamed the nationís two major bank regulators, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, for failing to set strict
enough policies.
ìI believe that B of A is being forced to pull out of it by the negligence of the
OCC and the Federal Reserve,î he said. ìThe two primary regulators have not
set a standard for subprime lending, to avoid local legislation like the North
Carolina legislation. This puts enormous pressure on financial institutions
that might like to do the right thing.î
Id.

60 See 2004 State Predatory Lending Bill Scorecard, at http://www.buteraandrews.com/state-local/b-index.htm (Jan. 16, 2004); Latest State Legislative and
Regulatory Mortgage News, Mortgage Bankers Assín, at http://www.mbaa.org/state_
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Each state, however, felt the need to ìtweakî the North Carolina
approach. This resulted in part from development by consumer
advocates of their own model laws, including the influential
AARP Model Home Loan Protection Act/Model State Statute.61
The AARP model law, issued on November 1, 2001, was prepared
by the same consumer advocates who spearheaded the North
Carolina legislative effort,62 and was based on statutes and
regulations from North Carolina, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
York, and the District of Columbia.63 The drafters of this model
law, however, made it far stricter than any existing state law or
regulation, incorporating such controversial elements as assignee
liability and criminal penalties.64 It was not long until some
states, with encouragement from consumer advocates, started
contemplating similarly severe, advocacy-driven laws.
For
example, the Georgia Fair Lending Act,65 the New Mexico Home
Loan Protection Act,66 and the New Jersey Ownership Security
Act67 each borrow liberally from the language and provisions of
the AARP model.
Most states that have evaluated the need for high-cost home
loan laws have opted to take the comprehensive, threshold-based
approach of the original North Carolina law. Some states, such
as Pennsylvania,68 Ohio,69 Oklahoma,70 Florida,71 Texas,72 and
Kentucky,73 adopted regulations and statutes that directly
tracked HOEPA. Others, including Massachusetts,74 Illinois,75
the District of Columbia,76 Georgia,77 New Jersey,78 New
Mexico,79 California,80 New York,81 Arkansas,82 and South
update/index.cfm?STRING=http://www.mbaa.org/state_update/states.asp (last visited
Apr. 4, 2004).
61 HOME LOAN PROTECTION ACT: A MODEL STATE STATUTE (AARP Pub. Políy Inst.
2001), http://research.aarp.org/consume/d17346_loan.pdf.
62 The model statute was co-written by Mike Calhoun, an attorney with Self-Help
Credit Union and a member of the original North Carolina working group. Id. at 1.
63 See id. at 31.
64 Id. at 26-29.
65 GA. CODE ANN. ß 7-6A-4 (1997 & Supp. 2003).
66 N.M. STAT. ANN. ßß 58-21A-1 to 58-21A-14 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2003).
67 N.J. STAT. ANN. ßß 17:3B-1 to 17:3B-46 (West 2000).
68 10
P A.
CODE
ßß
7.1
7.9
(1998),
available
at
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/010/010toc.html.
69 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ß 1.63 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
70 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, ßß 2081-2093 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
71 FLA. STAT. ANN. ßß 494.0078-494.00797 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
72 TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. chs. 343-345 (Vernon 1998).
73 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ßß 294.010-294.990 (Banks-Baldwin 2001 & Supp. 2003).
74 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 209, ß 32.32 (2003), available at http://www.state.ma.us/dob
/209cmr32.pdf.
75 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, ßß 345.10-345.150 (2001).
76 D.C. CODE ANN. ß 26-1151.01 to 26-1155.01 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
77 GA. CODE ANN. ßß 7-6A-1 to 7-6A-13 (1997 & Supp. 2003).
78 N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. ßß 17:3B-1 to 17:3B-46 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
79 N.M. STAT. ANN. ßß 58-21A-1 to 58-21A-14 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2003).
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Carolina,83 have enacted non-standard, unique statutes or
regulations that are comprehensive and unprecedented in that
particular stateís body of law. But generally speaking, all of the
threshold-based laws have been ìmodeledî after North Carolinaís
statute in much the same way S. 1149 was based on HOEPA.
The widespread legislative surge toward threshold-based
laws has created a regulatory Tower of Babel for multi-state
residential mortgage lenders, particularly those specializing in
non-prime, higher-risk loans. The various state laws now in
effect are generally similar, but no two are exactly alike.84 A
compliance-oriented, multi-state lender must deconstruct each of
these laws or ordinances to determine their basic application,
mathematical rules, and potential downside risk. Again, the
design of nearly all of these laws is product-based rather than
lender type-based, so it is typically imprudent for any particular
lender (whether bank, credit union, finance company, mortgage
banker, or mortgage broker) to assume that a state or local law
will not apply to it.
As threshold-based mortgage lending laws have spread,
however, other states have followed the two-step approach
ultimately adopted by North Carolina. That is, many states have
either included specific provisions aimed at mortgage loan
origination (sales) practices in an otherwise threshold-based law,
orólike North Carolinaócreated a parallel state law on
banker/broker regulation and reform. This has occurred, for
example, in Oklahoma,85 Kentucky,86 Nevada,87 Arkansas,88 and
South Carolina.89 Additionally, many states have either passed
or amended regulatory and oversight laws governing bankers
and brokers outside the immediate context of predatory lending,
including Washington,90 Ohio,91 Florida,92 and Idaho.93
These competing trends demonstrate the statesí central role
in the ìpractice vs. productî debate. The debate was first framed
CAL. FIN. CODE ß 4970-4974 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
N.Y. PRIV. HOUSE. FIN. LAW ßß 40-41.11 (McKinney 2002).
ARK. CODE ANN. ßß 23-39-501 to 23-39-516 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003).
S.C. CODE ANN. ßß 37-23-10 to 37-23-20 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2003).
See Ted Cornwell, Servicers Want National Standard, NATíL MORTGAGE NEWS,
Feb. 23, 2004, at 22.
85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, ßß 2081-2093 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
86 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ßß 294.010-294.990 (Banks-Baldwin 2001 & Supp. 2003).
87 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. ßß 645B.020-645B.050 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2001).
88 ARK. CODE ANN. ßß 23-39-503 to 23-39-505 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003).
89 S.C. CODE ANN. ß 40-58-10 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2003).
90 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ß 31.04.102 (West 1986 & Supp. 2004).
91 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ß 1.63 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
92 FLA. STAT. ANN. ßß 494.0078-494.00797 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
93 IDAHO CODE ß 26-310 to 26-316 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003).
80
81
82
83
84
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in Comptroller of the Currency John Hawkeís remarks before the
Exchequer Club in Washington, D.C. in April 2003.94
Comptroller Hawke expressed his belief that regulation of
mortgage lending practices would be less market disruptive and
more effective for consumers than the state-by-state regulation of
mortgage products via anti-predatory lending laws.95 In effect,
his remarks highlighted the distinction between advisory letters
issued by his office on Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices
(AL 2003-2)96 and Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending
Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans (AL 2002-3).97
Proponents of practice-based regulation98 and advocates of
threshold-based laws99 promptly joined the debate. The latter
observers, including many consumer advocates, argued that the
distinction between practice and product regulation is false, and
that threshold-based predatory lending laws prohibit practices
rather than products.100 These proponents, however, miss the
point: When laws such as S. 1149 are built of ambiguous
definitions and unknown legal, reputational, and economic risks,
the laws, in effect, do prohibit products because lenders
ultimately will refuse to offer them. And it must again be noted
that the product-prohibitive statute was not the final solution to
the perceived problem of predatory lending in North Carolina.
VI. NORTH CAROLINAíS MORTGAGE LENDING ACT: A
CORRECTIVE STEP
The critical second step in North Carolinaís battle against
predatory lending, the North Carolina Mortgage Lending Act,
was passed in 2001 and took effect July 1, 2002.101 For the first
94 Press Release, John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before
the
Exchequer
Club,
Washington,
D.C.
(Apr.
16,
2003),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/scripts/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=NY6CA3Z8.xml.
95 See id.
96 David Hammaker, OCC Advisory Letter AL 2003-2, http://www.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/advisory/2003%2D2.doc.
97 Julie L. Williams & Emory W. Rushton, OCC Advisory Letter AL 2002-3,
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002%2D3.doc.
98 See, e.g., Michele Heller, In Brief: Focus of Anti-Predator Laws Hit, AM. BANKER,
May 30, 2003, Washington, at 3. Wayne Abernathy, the Treasury Assistant Secretary for
financial institutions, stated that to his dismay, anti-predatory lending proposals were
more focused on products than on practices. Id.
99 See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart, Commentary, Toward One Competitive and Fair
Mortgage Market: Suggested Reforms in A Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right
Direction, 82 TEX. L. REV. 421, 422-23 (2003) (arguing that ì[m]uch work remains,î
despite the passage of HOEPA and numerous similar state statutes); John Taylor, AntiPredator Laws Target Practices Not Products, AM. BANKER, June 20, 2003, Viewpoints, at
6 (commenting on speech by Wayne Abernathy, Assistant Secretary for Financial
Institutions, United States Department of the Treasury).
100 Taylor, supra note 99, at 6.
101 S. 904 was signed into law on August 29, 2001 (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. ßß 53-
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time ever, North Carolinaís law imposed license requirements on
individual employees involved in making or brokering residential
mortgage loans in the state.102 These individuals include all
employees of licensed mortgage bankers or mortgage brokers who
are ìloan officers,î ìbranch managers,î and ìmanaging
principals.î103 All are now required to demonstrate significant
levels of experience in the business and must take a course and
pass an examination under the Act.104 Despite the fact that
chartered financial institutions (banks, thrifts, credit unions) are
exempt from the Mortgage Lending Act, the North Carolina
Banking Commissionerís office received over 10,000 individual
ìloan officerî applications during the initial licensing period.105
During the first year of the Actís effectiveness, the North
Carolina Banking Commissioner denied about 750 of these
applications, or approximately seven percent of the total.106
Under the Banking Commissionerís authority, grounds for
rejection include moral turpitude, past criminal record, or
misleading application materials.107
The Commissionerís new authority under the Mortgage
Lending Act also includes investigatory, oversight, and
enforcement powers.108 In November 2003, Commissioner Joseph
A. Smith, Jr. commented that his office was headed for a record
year in consumer complaints, with seventy-five percent of the
complaints arising from conduct by mortgage lenders, brokers,
and their loan officers.109 Assuming that the persons most likely
to engage in abusive or predatory practices will be the ones
denied the ability to (lawfully) work in the mortgage lending
business, the Act should have the effect of reducing abusive or
predatory home loans. The licensing, education, and experience
requirements simply reinforce this.110
Perhaps the most important policy aspect of the Act and
parallel laws in other states is that it places responsibility on the
mortgage loan originator to conduct the sale in a fair and honest
manner. The originator thus becomes directly and personally
243.01 to 53-243.16 (2001)).
102 N.C. GEN. STAT. ß 53-243.02 (2003).
103 Id. ßß 53-243.01, 53-243.05.
104 Id. ß 53-243.05.
105 See Letter from Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Commissioner of Banks, to Hon. Michael
Easley, Governor, North Carolina 1 (Sept. 23, 2003) (on file with author).
106 Id.
107 N.C. GEN. STAT. ß 53-243.12 (2003).
108 Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The North Carolina Mortgage Lending Act: Results of the
First Year, Challenges to Come, Address to Charlotte Area Mortgage Lenders (Nov. 6,
2003), http://www.banking.state.nc.us/commissionerpage.htm.
109 Id.
110 N.C. GEN. STAT. ß 53-243.02 (2003).
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responsible for his or her conduct toward the borrower, with both
legal and economic incentives to behave in an ethical and honest
This approach removes esoteric and legally
manner.111
complicated doctrines of third party liability, such as assignee
and transferee liability for originator wrongdoing, from the
legislative and policy debate. By doing so, it enables legislatures
to enact straightforward, understandable laws that prevent
abusive and unfair mortgage loans from being made in the first
place. Stronger regulation of mortgage loan originators is
supported by the National Association of Mortgage Brokers
(ìNAMBî), the leading national trade group for mortgage
brokers. NAMB has published a model statute for states that are
considering new laws in this area.112
Moreover, any state that enacts non-standard, thresholdbased legislation aimed at high-cost loans creates serious
compliance burdens on all residential mortgage lenders,
particularly if the law generally prohibits or limits certain
practices. This has occurred repeatedly, in part because nonstandard (non-HOEPA-based) statutes inevitably contain novel,
ambiguous definitions and calculation tools for determining the
thresholds or triggers.113 Because many of the new statutes and
ordinances are not consistent with HOEPA and Regulation Z,
compliance with HOEPA does not automatically equate to
compliance with state law, creating increased risk of lender
confusion and non-compliance. This provides yet another reason
why sales-practices reform is preferable.
If a law regulating mortgage sales practices and procedures
creates less disruption in the marketplace, minimizes lender
confusion, and places culpability with the actual wrongdoer, then
it should be given the first opportunity to function. Only if such
regulation fails should the state consider a threshold-based law.
This is what North Carolina should have done, and it is the
lesson that other states should learn. Nationwide, the states
that are coupling relatively moderate HOEPA-based productprohibitive laws with stronger practice-prohibitive laws like S.
904 are taking the preferable approach. States that enact
punitive, threshold-based laws that extend liability to remote
participants in the mortgage lending process, such as assignees
Id. ßß 53-243.05, 53-243.12 (2003).
MODEL STATE STATUTE INITIATIVE: LICENSING, PRE-LICENSURE EDUCATION AND
CONTINUING EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL ORIGINATORS (Natíl Assín of Mortgage
Brokers 2002), http://www.namb.org/government_affairs/state_licensing/model_state_
statute.pdf.
113 See CBA Overview of High-Cost Home Loan Statutes, Regulations and Ordinances,
Consumer Bankers Association, http://www.cbanet.org/Issues/Subprime_lending/subprim
e_lending.html (updated Sep. 2003).
111
112
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and transferees, are risking market disruption.114 Whether this
is appropriate public policy is open to debate, and whether
ìstricterî state laws can actually reduce the incidence of
predatory practices without disrupting the legitimate flow of loan
capital to deserving borrowers is not yet known. The North
Carolina experience, as noted, is not encouraging.115
VII. BEYOND HOEPA: A SINGLE FEDERAL STANDARD?
Against this background of proliferating state and local laws,
a significant question today is whether a ìsingle federal
standardî is appropriate. Such a standard would presumably
impose a single set of rules, applicable as a matter of federal law,
to classes of loans deemed to be in need of closer regulation. A
straightforward way to achieve this would be by amendments to
HOEPA, coupled with federal preemption of contrary state law.
This approach is exemplified by the proposed Responsible
Lending Act,116 introduced into Congress in 2003 by Reps. Robert
Ney (R-Ohio) and Ken Lucas (D-Ky.). The bill would lower
HOEPA triggers to encompass more home loans, while also
adding consumer protections such as limits on mandatory
arbitration and default terms, debt-to-income limits, prepayment
penalty limitations, and prohibitions against single-premium
credit life insurance for those seeking such loans.117 In essence,
the Ney-Lucas bill seeks to codify, uniformly, most of the key
protective limitations and prohibitions that have emerged in the
states in the last several years. Finally, it establishes uniform
licensing and minimum national standards for mortgage brokers
and calls for the oft-suggested creation of a national mortgagebroker database.118 In short, the bill addresses both products and
practices, and, as such, is drawing fire from advocates of the
strictly threshold-based, product-based approach.119
114 Subprime lenders plan to cut back loan origination in New Jersey by 70% when
the new predatory lending law goes into effect. Erick Bergquist, N.J. Law Has Lenders
Set For Cutbacks, AM. BANKER, Nov. 25, 2003, at 1. Fitch, Inc. stated they would not rate
pools backed by high cost loans because the law allowed for unlimited assignee liability.
Id. Standard and Poorís Corp. declared that it would no longer rate bonds backed by
many loans originated in Georgia, because the lawís assignee liability provision made
them too dangerous for investors. Erick Bergquist, Ga. Amended Predator Law After
Preapproval by S&P, AM. BANKER, March 11, 2003, at 1. Lenders argued that, without
ratings by the agencies, it would be hard to sell bonds backed by the loans, and thus
funding for subprime loans in the state would dry up. Id.
115 See supra notes 49, 50 & 58 and accompanying text.
116 H.R. 833, 108th Cong. (2003).
117 See id. ß 102.
118 Id. ßß 302-312.
119 See Poll Shows Support for B&C Rules, NATíL MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 8, 2003, at
13. ìWhen congressmen Ney and Lucas introduced their bill (H.R. 833) in February,
consumer groups panned it, claiming it contained few consumer protections and it

LAMPE FINAL - MAY 28

153

5/28/2004 4:39 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 7:135

Federally chartered banks, thrifts, and credit unions are not
in need of a preemptive federal statute due to a host of
preemption rulings and regulations from the federal banking
agencies regarding state anti-predatory lending laws.120
Preemption for federal thrifts and national banks applies to the
operating subsidiaries of such institutions, but not to all
corporate subsidiaries or affiliates.121 Obviously, federal banking
agency preemption results in a competitive disadvantage to nonfederally chartered or non-institution-affiliated mortgage
companies, who cannot claim its benefits. Accordingly, a singlepoint federal standard would better serve non-bank mortgage
lenders than sporadic preemption rulings and interpretations by
federal banking agencies.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It is well known that the residential mortgage lending
industry is national in scope. Most residential mortgage loans,
whether originated by banks or mortgage companies, are sold
into the securities market.122 Therefore, originators rely on
capital from a national market. If nothing else, the plethora of
weakened the existing federal anti-predatory lending law [HOEPA].î Id.
120 See Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision (Jan.
21, 2003) (Form Letter P-2003-1) (preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act),
http://www.ots.treas.gov/hola03.html; Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office
of Thrift Supervision (Jan. 30, 2003) (Form Letter P-2003-2) (preemption of New York
predatory lending law), http://www.ots.treas.gov/hola03.html; Letter from Carolyn J.
Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision (July 22, 2003) (Form Letter P-2003-5)
(preemption of New Jersey predatory lending act), http://www.ots.treas.gov/hola03.html;
Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision (Sep. 2, 2003)
(Form Letter P-2003-6) (preemption of New Mexico Home Loan Protection Act),
http://www.ots.treas.gov/hola03.html. See also Letter from Sheila A. Albin, Associate
General Counsel, National Credit Union Association, to Carla J. Cerniglia, Senior
Compliance Specialist, New York State Credit Union League Inc. (March 2, 2001)
(discussing applicability of state lending regulation to federal credit unions),
http://www.ncua.gov/ref/opinion_letters/2000/00-0827.html; Letter from Sheila A. Albin,
Associate General Counsel, National Credit Union Association, to Richard P. Kessler, Jr.,
Macey, Wilensky, Wittner & Kessler, LLP (July 29, 2002) (applicability of Georgia Fair
Lending Act to federal credit unions), http://www.ncua.gov/ref/opinion_letters/2002/020649.html. As to national banks, see Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate
Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
7 & 34).
121 See Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision (Jan.
21, 2003) (Form Letter P-2003-1), http://www.ots.treas.gov/hola03.html; Letter from
Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision (Jan. 30, 2003) (Form Letter
P-2003-2), http://www.ots.treas.gov/hola03.html; Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief
Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision (July 22, 2003) (Form Letter P-2003-5),
http://www.ots.treas.gov/hola03.html; Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office
of
Thrift
Supervision
(Sep.
2,
2003)
(Form
Letter
P-2003-6),
http://www.ots.treas.gov/hola03.html; Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate
Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
7 & 34).
122 Henry Savage, Zoning Curbs Loan Prospects, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at F23.
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state and local anti-predatory lending laws impedes the flow of
legitimate capital from national sources to local originators.
Needless to say, whether this reduction in funds available to
borrowers is salutary or destructive is part of the debate. Some
consumer advocates believe that under existing laws, certain
home loans simply should not be made. The design and impact of
North Carolinaís initial anti-predatory lending law is an example
of consumer advocates prevailing in this view.

